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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes chronologically the causes of the
collapse of communism in East Germany.
The principal
guideline for this analysis is Peter Gourevitch's
hypothesis.
Gourevitch stresses the importance of examining
domestic and international politics simultaneously, as a
whole, and not as separate parts.
Therefore to discover the
reasons for the collapse of communism in East Germany, it is
necessary to focus on both internal and external pressures.
The East German regime lost power due to a combination
of three factors (one internal and two external). First,
domestic problems existed in the East German economic,
social and political systems.
These problems were
exacerbated as East and West German relations improved.
Second, persistent West German financial, cultural and
technical penetration into East Germany provided
alternatives to the communist political, ideological and
economic models.
Finally, the Soviet Union's own internal
economic crisis forced the Soviet leaders to relinquish
their hegemony of East Germany.
The Soviet leaders made it
clear that Soviet troops would no longer be used to protect
the anti-reformist East German government.
This
unanticipated decision sparked the East Germans to revolt
against their leaders.
Additionally, this paper examines the definitions of
legitimation and revolution theories and applies them to the
particular case of East Germany.

v

THE COLLAPSE OF COMMUNISM IN EAST GERMANY
1945 - 1990

INTRODUCTION

In late 1989, communist regimes collapsed unexpectedly
throughout Eastern Europe.

The weak and illegitimate East

German regime was no exception.

A combination of three

factors, two external and one internal, led the East Germans
to revolt.

First, domestic problems inherent in the

ineffectual East German social, economic and political
systems contributed to the communists' fall from power.
Second, the successful West German penetration into East
Germany gave the East Germans aspirations towards another
political, social and economical model.

Finally, the Soviet

Union called for radical reforms not only in the Soviet
Union but also in Eastern Europe and thus openly challenged
the authority of the anti-reformist East German communist
regime.
The recent fall of the East German communist party
(SED) will be analyzed by exploring several schools of
thought.

The over-arching theoretical basis for this thesis

is Peter Gourevitch's hypothesis that international politics
and domestic politics must be analyzed together as an
integrated whole.

According to Gourevitch, international

and domestic politics are interrelated.
2

They affect each
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other and cannot be separated.

Although Gourevitch's

hypothesis seems elementary, writers often tend to
concentrate on either domestic or international factors and
thus provide incomplete analyses.

Therefore, in order to

comprehend fully the reasons for the downfall of the SED it
is essential not only to explore the internal situation in
East Germany, but to examine the impact of external
pressures as well.
Using Gourevitch's hypothesis as the foundation of this
paper, traditional domestic theories of legitimation and
revolution will be examined in the context of the
international system.

First, although legitimation theories

explain how regimes gain popular acceptance and support, in
the GDR, the East Germans saw the SED as illegitimate, yet
the SED was the party in power.

In this state, political

authority depended not on popular support, but on force.
Throughout its tenure, the SED did attempt to establish
indigenous legitimacy using different procedures, such as
economic achievements or ideology; however, as the various
chapters will show, in the end, it failed.

The East Gentian

population realized that other nations, specifically Western
ones, had alternative legitimation methods which emphasized
participation and responsiveness.

The international system

allowed a comparison of Eastern and Western legitimation
techniques and clearly the Western way proved more
attractive.

4

Second, most revolution theories tend to highlight the
importance of domestic conditions and therefore isolate the
state from international political developments.

Yet, in

the particular case of the GDR it is impossible to separate
the internal events from the external ones; it is evident
that external factors created the catalyst which led to the
East German revolt.

Outside pressures from West Germany and

from the Soviet Union contributed to the fall of the East
German communists.

West Germany (FRG) penetrated East

Germany (GDR) politically, economically and socially through
various means such as the Deutschemark and television.

The

Soviet Union, with hegemony over Eastern Europe, greatly
influenced the foreign and domestic policies of the SED.
Mikhail Gorbachev's sweeping policy changes and the SED's
reluctance to accept them, ultimately destroyed the
political control of the East German communist party.
Gorbachev introduced momentous changes in Soviet domestic
and foreign policy which sparked the tumultuous events in
Eastern Europe.

Therefore, the East German revolution did

not occur solely as a result of domestic conditions, but
because of a combination of both domestic and external
factors.
Just before midnight on 9 November 1989, the SED
officially decided to open East Germany's borders with the
West.

The East German communists' attempted isolation of

the East German population had come to an end.

What few

5

people realize, however, is that the isolation had alreadyended before the SED opened up East Germany's borders.
"fall of the Berlin Wall" did not occur overnight.

The

For

decades West Germany systematically chipped away at East
Germany.

Through its political advances, economic

assistance and technological prowess, West Germany gradually
managed to penetrate a supposedly impenetrable communist
society.

Although East Germany's communists tried

desperately to control the amount of West German
penetration, and apparently succeeded for some time, in the
end they failed.

The ideas and technology absorbed from the

West proved more powerful than those of the SED.

The FRG's

successful penetration of East German society contributed to
the destruction of the wall, to ending three decades of the
SED's control of the GDR, and finally to the termination of
the German Democratic Republic itself.
This thesis will demonstrate the critical role played
by the Soviet Union in the breakdown of Communism in East
Germany.

From the end of World War II until 1989, few

doubted the Soviet Union's hegemony over Eastern Europe.
fact, until the chaotic events of 1989, many failed to
realize that the USSR's hold over its satellite communist
states was weakening.

For years, political analysts had

stressed East Germany's strategic importance to the Soviet
Union and argued that the USSR would use military power to
keep the GDR within the communist bloc.

However, recent

In
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events proved those analysts wrong.

Not only did the Soviet

Union under the leadership of Gorbachev allow the political
transformation of East Germany to a democratic state, he
also allowed the GDR to leave the Warsaw Pact and join NATO.
This thesis will address chronologically the collapse
of the SED in seven chapters.

Chapter I explains how the

international state system affected the domestic and foreign
policies of the postwar Germanies and raises questions
regarding the legitimacy of the East German regime.

Chapter

II discusses the period of detente (from the late 1960s to
the mid-1970s) between the United States and the Soviet
Union and explains how it affected the East and West German
regimes.

Chapter III recounts the establishment of official

relations between East and West Germany.

It describes

measures taken by the East German regime to prevent Western
pressures from creating any internal destabilization in the
GDR.

Chapter IV explains the various forms of West German

penetration into East Germany (economic, human and
technological) and discusses their impact on the East German
population and the SED regime.

Chapter V examines the

erosion of detente in the early 1980s between the United
States and the Soviet Union and contrasts the decay of
superpower relations with the continued improvement in East
and West German relations.

Chapter V also explains how and

why this bilateral detente was carried out.

Chapter VI

introduces Gorbachev and his inventive policy changes.

It
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shows how these policy changes contributed to the East
German revolt against their communist leaders.

Finally,

Chapter VII reiterates the internal and external causes of
the collapse of communism in the East Germany.

CHAPTER I
LEGITIMACY AND THE QUESTION OF REUNIFICATION:

1940S-60S

The postwar era and the quickly emerging AmericanSoviet rivalry determined the fate of a nation once known as
Germany.

This fact relates to Peter Gourevitch's theory

which stresses the inseparability of internal and external
events.

He states that domestic and international politics

are parts of an interactive system.

When Germany was

divided into East and West Germany, both states' internal
and external policies reflected those of the Soviet Union
and the United States.

This included their patrons'

strategies for legitimizing rule.

While the West emphasized

responsiveness and participation, the East emphasized
ideology and economic achievement; however, force was the
only real source of legitimation there.

In addition to

legitimation strategies, both East and West Germany followed
their respective patron's position in regard to
reunification.
Although much of divided Germany lay in ruins after
World War II, this area was still viewed by the victors as
central to the future of Europe.

Therefore, the character

of the postwar Germanies was shaped by the goals and
8
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priorities of the principal victorious powers.

The United

States and the Soviet Union determined the political,
economic and social systems that East and West Germany
adopted.

One was to be a free, democratic state,

legitimized by popular support, while the other one would
become a tightly controlled, socialist state, ruled by
force.

With each Germany linked by strong political,

military and economic ties to its respective patron,
international developments would affect greatly the policies
of both East and West Germany.
The dominant roles played by the United States and the
Soviet Union in the international political arena explains
the partition of the German nation in 1945.
Gourevitch states:

As Peter

"International politics explains the

dismemberment of Germany after 1945 and the character of the
two regimes which have grown up in the East and West."1 At
the end of World War II, the continent of Europe was divided
into two opposing spheres— a socialist one under the
hegemony of the Soviet Union and a democratic one influenced
by the United States.

The postwar era is described as:

"A

historical anomaly in which the Continent was dominated by
two outside powers, whose alliances and nuclear arsenals

1Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed:
The
International Sources of Domestic Politics," International
Organizations 32 (Autumn 1987):
899.
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maintained a fretful balance."2

Hitler's defeated Nazi

Germany was also divided as the Cold War between the two
superpowers emerged.

Under the leadership of Joseph Stalin,

the Soviet Union seized the eastern portion of Germany,
which officially became known in October 1949 as the German
Democratic Republic.

Simultaneously, the three remaining

allied war powers (the United States, Great Britain and
France), pulled the western portion of Germany, which became
the Federal Republic of Germany, into their sphere of
influence.
Neither state had much choice in the matter because
external factors determined the character of each regime.
In the GDR, under a facade of democratization and free
elections, the Soviets backed a communist-led coalition
government, the Anti-fascist Democratic Front.3

By April

194 6, the Soviet Union forced the merger of the social
democrats with the communists, creating the Socialist Unity
Party (SED), which the communists dominated.

With the

abandonment of competitive elections in 1947, the SED
succeeded in squeezing out the opposition parties in the

2Russell Watson, Michael Meyers Margaret, Gerrard
Warner, and Fred Coleman, "A New Germany," Newsweek 9 July
1990, 29.
3According to William E. Griffith, ed., Central and
Eastern Europe:
The Opening Curtain?. (London: Westview
Press, 1989),
315, during World War II, under the direction
of the Soviet leadership, German Communist leaders exiled in
Moscow were planning to sovietize the Soviet zone of
Germany.
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coalition.

The opposition, made up of the Christian

Democrats, Liberal Democrats, National Democratic Party of
Germany and the Democratic Farmers' Association, banded
together to create the National Front, which by 1949, the
SED effectively dominated.4

Propped up by Moscow, the East

German revolutionary regime ruled by force and not popular
support.

Although elections existed, they did not afford

the possibility of choice between political alternatives,
but instead were propagandistic in nature.5
Meanwhile, the FRG had no real alternative but to
become a democratic state aligned with the Western nations
and the concept of legitimate rule by popular support.
E.H. Albert observed:

As

"The only choice Federal Germany ever

had was between protecting its security by joining the
Western alliance, or jeopardizing its freedom through
staying neutral."6

Thus occurred the division of what was

once one nation into two states— each one having separate
political, economic and social systems and each one with

4Eric Waldman, "The German Democratic Republic:
Moscow's Faithful Ally," in East Central Europe:
Yesterday.
Today. Tomorrow. ed. Milorad Drachkovitch (Stanford: Hoover
University Press, 1982), 268.
5Georg Brunner, "Legitimacy Doctrines and Legitimation
Procedures in East European Systems," in Political
Legitimation in Communist States, eds. T. H. Rigby and
Ferenc Feher (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1982), 38.
6E.H. Albert, "The Brandt Doctrine of Two States in
Germany," International Affairs (London) 46 (April 1970):
298.
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leading parties having different strategies for legitimizing
their power.
As previously mentioned, the postwar evolution of
domestic and foreign policy in the divided Germanies can
only be understood in the context of the geopolitics of the
United States/Soviet rivalry.

During the 1950s and 1960s

East and West German foreign and domestic policies changed
because of external pressure from their respective alliance
partners (the United States and the Soviet Union) and also
because of internal pressure.

In determining the reasons

for these policy shifts, it is necessary to examine
international relations and domestic politics together.
Separate studies of the international and domestic political
realms would provide an incomplete analysis of the
motivations behind the changes.

Political theorist Peter

Gourevitch states the two are parts of an interactive system
and makes the important conclusion:
The international system is not only a consequence of
domestic politics and structures but a cause of them.
Economic relations and military pressures constrain an
entire range of domestic behaviors, from policy
decisions to political forms.
International relations
and domestic politics are therefore so interrelated
that they should be analyzed simultaneously, as
wholes.
Viewed in this context, the evolution of the post-war
Germanies would be affected by the changing dynamics of a
world divided by competing political and military alliances

7Gourevitch, 911.
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shaped by Moscow and Washington.

As we shall see, domestic

politics, trade and military pressures were also part of an
interactive system that shaped the course of not only the
two Germanies but the bi-polar world order following World
War II.
The struggle over the future of Germany, which began
with the defeat of the Third Reich, became a struggle over
the future of Europe.

As East European regimes fell under

the authority of the Soviet Union, the United States and
West European states perceived a rising threat of communist
aggression against Western Europe.

It was in this context

that two hostile military alliances arose in 1955.
Sponsored by the United States, the Federal Republic joined
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

In response

to the formation of NATO, the Soviet Union created the
Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), which the GDR joined in
1956.

It is important to note that the United States and

the Soviet Union dominated their respective alliances and
that as a result, neither the GDR nor the FRG could act
independently without the consent of its powerful patron.8
Political scientist Ernest Plock explains the relationships:
Given the dominant political and military role of the
U.S. and USSR in the affairs of the newly created East
and West German states, it was hardly surprising that
the external policies of the Federal Republic of
Germany (FRG) and German Democratic Republic (GDR) were

8Eric G. Frey, Division and Detente:
The Germanies and
Their Alliances (New York:
Praeger, 1987), 59.
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viewed as appendages to those conducted by their
founding patrons.
The fact that the United States and the Soviet Union
dominated West and East German domestic and foreign affairs
created challenges to the legitimacy of the two regimes,
although less so for the FRG leaders than for the SED.
Although many definitions of legitimacy exist, according to
German political analyst Henry Krisch, "Legitimacy is the
foundation of such governmental power as is exercised both
with a consciousness on the governments part that it has
the right to govern with some recognition by the governed of
that right."10

Similarly, T. H. Rigby defines the concept

of legitimate political authority as follows:
The expectation of political authorities that people
will comply with their demands is typically based nq,t
only on such considerations as the latter's fear of
punishment, hope of reward, habit or apathy, but also
on the notion that they have the right to make such
demands.11
Whereas the Federal Republic was a state that through
self-determination and free elections chose to become
democratic, the East German regime was viewed by West
9Ernest D. Plock, The Basic Treaty and the Evolution of
East-West German Relations (London: Westview Press, 198 6),
3.

10Henry Krisch, "Political Legitimation in the German
Democratic Republic," in Political Legitimation in Communist
States, eds. T. H. Rigby and Ferenc Feher (New York:
St.
Martin*s Press, 1982), 111.
11T. H. Rigby, "Introduction:
Political Legitimacy,
Weber, and Communist Mono-organisational Systems," in
Political Legitimation in Communist States, eds. T. H. Rugby
and Ferenc Feher (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1982), 1.
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Germany and even by the East German population as having no
legitimacy based on popular support.

Although the East

German communist leaders believed they had the right to
rule, the SED never enjoyed an essential element of
legitimacy— positive popular acceptance or internal support
for its rule.

Because the eastern zone was taken over

militarily by the Soviet Union and the Germans living there
had no choice in determining their own political, economic
or social systems, the GDR regime was seen by both the
Western world and the East German population as
illegitimate.

The use of Soviet troops on 17 June 1953 to

crush an East German popular uprising and the increasing
number of East Germans fleeing the GDR confirmed the
regime's illegitimacy.

As Soviet troops remained stationed

in the GDR and coerced the East German population into
obedience, it seems obvious that force became the SED's only
source of legitimation.12
The SED's legitimacy gap was compounded by the fact
that unlike the democratic FRG, the communist GDR state was
dominated by a single, highly centralized party which did
not permit any meaningful opposition or competition.

This

dominant party, in which both political and economic
authority were placed, allowed no autonomy for society.

12After the uprising, the G D R 1s leaders were dependent
on force and the presence of over 350,000 Soviet troops to
maintain their stability.
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Polish-born author and theorist Maria Markus described the
SED's legitimacy crisis by stating:
The GDR seem[ed] to be characterized by a virtually
complete absence of all the substantive conditions
pertaining to the modern form of legitimation (the
people as the source of authority, the autonomy of
civil society and the possibility of formulation of and
choice between alternatives.)13
The GDR regime perceived its lack of legitimacy and
attempted to rectify this situation through both external
and domestic policy initiatives.

On the domestic front, the

GDR regime attempted to gain legitimacy through its social
and economic policies.

The SED used Marxist-Leninist

ideology to educate the East German population and justify
its rule.

The regime linked its rule to the tradition of

the Soviet Union for the SED had no previous tradition of
its own.14

Besides using propaganda for self-legitimation,

the SED sought to use task-oriented policies to achieve
legitimacy.

According to Henry Krisch the question of

legitimacy in the GDR "can best be understood by defining
legitimacy as the intended outcome of a set of regime
policies congruent with the particular circumstances of the

13Maria Markus, "Overt and Covert Modes of Legitimation
in East European Societies," in Political Legitimation in
Communist States, eds. T. H. Rigby and Ferenc Feher (New
York:
St. Martin's Press, 1982), 83.
14Agnes Heller, "Phases of Legitimation in Soviet-type
Societies," Political Legitimation in Communist States, eds.
T. H. Rigby and Ferenc Feher (New York:
St. Martin's Press,
1982):
62.
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state and the aspirations of the people.15

The .means for

achieving popular support in the GDR would be through the
policies themselves.

So, unlike Western nations who seek

legitimacy through rule-oriented policies, policies derived
from a consensus among the governed, the SED believed it
could gain legitimacy through goal-oriented, economic
policies set by the leaders.16

These policies ignored

popular acceptance and responsiveness and emphasized
economic output and achievement.
The GDR regime also hoped to convert its coerced
legitimacy into real legitimacy through seeking the FRG1s
acknowledgement of East G e r m a n y ^ statehood.

But for the

Federal Republic to acknowledge the other German state was
seen by West German leaders to be defeating their goal o &
reunification. This West German conviction that the East
German regime lacked legitimacy was expressed in the form of
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer1s Hallstein Doctrine (1955), in
which Bonn refused to maintain diplomatic relations with any
government that had relations with the GDR.17
Confident in the legitimacy of their regime and

15Krisch, "Political Legitimation in the GDR," 113.
16Ibid.
17The Federal Republic hoped that the Hallstein
Doctrine would cause the political and economic
destabilization of East Germany and thus would lead to
German reunification.
The FRG did not apply the doctrine to
the USSR for Bonn and Moscow already had established
relations earlier that year.
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convinced they were expressing and representing a national
consensus, West German policy makers sought two main foreign
policy goals.

The first goal was to reunify Germany and the

second, and more pressing one, was to establish strong ties
to the West.

However, these two aims proved to be

contradictory in the short run.
The preamble of the FRG's 1949 constitution, known as
the Basic Law, contains the unification imperative:

"The

entire German people is called on to achieve in free selfdetermination the unity and freedom of Germany."18

Without

reunification, there would be no relations with the eastern
portion of Germany and therefore, no negotiations on other
matters.

According to Josef Korbel, "he [Adenauer] wanted

to act from a position of strength and to expose the
absurdity of a divided Germany by a complete isolation of
the Soviet satellite."19
Yet although Adenauer, as most other Germans, sincerely
sought unification, much of the reunification rhetoric was
intended for domestic political consumption.

Politicians

saw the German question to be a politically popular issue
and realized that they must maintain a rhetorical commitment
to reunification in order to satisfy the West German public,

18Plock, 12.
19Josef Korbel, "West Germany's Ostpolitik:
I, IntraGerman Relations," Orbis 13 (Winter 1970):
1050-51.
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even though reunification seemed infeasible in the short
run.
Adenauer's scheme of creating strong West German links
to the West proved to be more successful than his
reunification policy.

From the West, Adenauer sought

military security and economic resources to support
political and economic recovery for the FRG.

In order to

obtain them, the Chancellor needed to prove the FRG's
allegiance to NATO and West European stability.

Although

West Germany's allies continued to support Adenauer's call
for reunification, they viewed reunification with
apprehension.

Not only did they fear Germany's past

aggressive behavior, but they also did not want to upset the
recently established balance of power in Europe.

So,

despite West Germans' hope for reunification, its likelihood
seemed to lessen with each passing year as the FRG became
firmly integrated into the West and NATO.
The East German leader Walter Ulbricht and his fellow
communists also sought the goal of reunification
rhetorically— but on different terms from West Germany's.
The communist leader sought reunification, not as a
democratic state but as a socialist one.20

However, it is

unlikely that Ulbricht believed that unification of a
socialist Germany was a realistic option.

At home, Ulbricht

20Dietrich Orlow, History of Modern Germany:
1870 to
Present. (New Jersey:
Prentice Hall Inc., 1987), 333.
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had to contend with a dissatisfied East German population
who clearly wanted any reunification to take place on West
German rather than East German terms.
Abroad, the USSR's policy regarding reunification had
changed.

By 1955, the Soviet leadership had come to accept

the status quo in Central Europe and shifted its
reunification policy to a "two Germanies" policy.21

The

Soviets' goal of keeping the two German states separate was
quickly reflected in Ulbricht's own policy toward the ERG.
From the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 until 1971,
the GDR remained in a period of "normalization" or seclusion
from the West.
East Germany's policy of seclusion was motivated not
only by Soviet pressure but also by Ulbricht's own domestic
political strategy.

According to A. J. McAdams,

"Ulbricht

in particular was assuredly more interested in consolidating
his own state's authority than in the complexities of
maintaining international socialism."22

The SED leader

realized that contacts with the West were destabilizing and
believed the GDR would be better served by turning inward.
Ulbricht feared that closer ties with the Federal
Republic would delegitimize the GDR.

He saw the FRG as a

21Wolfram Hanrieder, West German Foreign Policy:
1979. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), 116.
22A. James McAdams, East Germany and Detente
(Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1985), 21.

1949-
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threatening ideological adversary.

According to Henry

Krisch:
The tangled web of the GDR's relationship both to its
German national heritage and to its West German
counterpart has provided the GDR leadership with an
enormously difficult problem of devising legitimacy
generating policy in this area.23
If official relations between the two Germanies were
established, Ulbricht believed that it would be impossible
to protect East Germans from the ways of the West Germans,
including their alternative form of legitimation.

So,

although Ulbricht rhetorically called for reunification in
the early 1950s, he did so only when the chances of it were
slim.

For example, he agreed on reunification if the FRG

were to discontinue its military alliance with NATO.24
During the late fifties and early sixties shifts
occurred in the international system which strongly affected
East-West German relations.

The Western nations began to

lose interest in the strategy of isolating the East German
state.

Despite the F R G 1s threat of ending relations with

other regimes which recognized the other jGerman state, NATO
nations began working towards official relations with the
GDR.

The Western allies shifted their focus from isolation

to developing diplomatic relations and expanding trade,
cultural and scientific exchanges.

Then as West Germany

became aware of its allies' desires for improved relations
23Krisch,
24Frey, 5.

"Political Legitimation in the GDR," 114.
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with the GDR, the FRG considered reversing its policy of
isolating East Germany.
The reversal of the F R G 1s policy of attempting to
isolate East Germany was due in part to West German leaders1
recognition that the policy was in fact having the opposite
effect than the one intended and also to the election of a
government of the center-left for the first time.

As other

members of the NATO alliance considered relations with the
communist bloc states and withdrew support for German
reunification, West Germany was faced with the danger of
isolating itself from diplomatic relations and international
trade.25

Gradually,

"Bonn realized the danger of its

negative stance toward the problem of peace and being left
behind in . . . relations with the East" and sought to
change its rigid policy towards East Germany.26
Changes in West German policy towards East Germany
began with Christian Democrat Ludwig Erhard's Ostpolitik
policy, by which, through the famous Peace Note of March
1966, Erhard's government shifted "from outright hostility
to the cautious opening of contacts with the countries of
Eastern Europe."27

During the CDU/SPD Grand Coalition

25This policy became official NATO doctrine in 1967
with the Harmel Report.
26Josef Korbel, "West Germany's Ostpolitik:
II, A
Policy Toward the Soviet Allies," Orbis 14 (Summer 1970):
329.
27Ibid.
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government's tenure, West Germany acknowledged that
reunification could be pursued by a general detente instead
of by isolation.

Thus while East Germany retained a policy

of isolation from the FRG throughout the 1960s, the West
German government gradually shifted its policy to one of
increased contact.
Without examining the international environment in the
immediate postwar period, one could not fully understand the
motivations driving East German foreign and domestic policy.
The postwar balance of power in Europe and the structure of
the German states were strongly influenced by the goals and
priorities of the United States and the Soviet Union.

The

US and the USSR had divergent goals which could not be
reconciled and led to the partition of Germany.

East and

West Germany adopted the political, economic and cultural
systems of their superpower allies.

Dominated by the United

States, West Germany adopted the institutions, structures
and procedures found in democratic states.

Dominated by the

Soviet Union, East Germany had little room for autonomous
domestic or foreign policy making.

This led the western

nations and the East Germans themselves to regard the SED
government as illegitimate.

Despite this view, Western

states began to consider establishing official relations
vt

with the East German regime in the late 1960s.

As the next

chapter reveals, in the long term, these relations came to
pose an even more powerful threat to the legitimacy of the
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East German regime than had been posed by the earlier policy
of isolation.

CHAPTER II
DETENTE: 1960S-70S

In West German foreign policy, and in East-West
relations generally, the period beginning in the late 1960s
and lasting until the mid-1970s was characterized by
detente.

This era witnessed an improvement in relations

between the Soviet Union and the United States which
trickled down into their respective spheres of influence.
As Gourevitch's theory asserts, the international
environment was to have an impact on the foreign policies of
the East and West German regimes.

For example, detente

between the US and the USSR provided an opening for the FRG
to seek greatly improved relations with East Germany.

Thus,

changes in the international environment facilitated a
policy shift on the part of the West German government.

Yet

although the West German regime appeared eager to establish
detente with the GDR in the late 1960s, the SED regime was
extremely reluctant, mainly for domestic political reasons.
East German leader Walter Ulbricht feared that increased
trade and cultural relations with West Germany might
undermine his regime by making East Germany appear inferior
in comparison to West Germany.

So, despite the prospect of

the GDR receiving international recognition, Ulbricht tried
unsuccessfully to prevent the establishment of East-West
German relations.
25
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International systemic factors interacted with domestic
political considerations to produce significant shifts in
East and West German policy during the period of detente.
In West Germany, the easing of cold war tensions provided
opportunities for the leadership to pursue its agenda of
improved relations with the GDR.

Meanwhile, in East

Germany, the Soviet Union's desires for detente ultimately
forced the recalcitrant East German leadership to abandon
their isolationist stance vis-a-vis the FRG.
By the late 1960s, West Germany had gained considerable
independence from the United States in the realm of foreign
policy.

Willy Brandt proclaimed that the Federal Republic

had "assumed a new responsibility" and was no longer a
"political dwarf."28

Nonetheless, the FRG's new goal of

establishing relations with the GDR did not contradict, and
in fact coincided with, reaffirmation of its commitment to
maintain strong relations with the Western nations and NATO.
West Germany realized that the Western powers would continue
to support inter-German relations, so long as the stability
of NATO and of West Germany's membership in it remained
intact.

In the past, the FRG had proved itself loyal to

NATO and had adhered successfully to the principles of
democracy.

The United States began to tolerate more

autonomous policy making by West German leaders towards the
East.
28Korbel, "Ostpolitik:

II," 327.
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However, as the FRG was gaining more autonomy in
conducting its international affairs, the Soviet Union's
hegemony over East German affairs continued.

Stressing the

concept of international socialism, the Soviet Union
emphasized that the GDR's national interests must be
secondary to those interests espoused by the USSR for the
good of all socialism.29

With Soviet troops stationed in

East Germany and its proximity to the USSR, the GDR's
foreign policy could be controlled effectively by the
Soviets.
In 1969, West German Chancellor Willy Brandt,
introduced a policy which called for rapprochement between
the two Germanies.30

Brandt's new policy was motivated by

the realization that the former policy of rejecting the GDR
as a state was punishing the people who lived there rather
than the government.

Like former regimes, the Brandt

Government continued to hope for and speak of reunification,
yet the chancellor did not wish to make the East German
population suffer for the actions of the Soviet controlled
communist government.

Brandt also saw an opportunity for

West Germany to benefit by allowing the FRG to expand its
29The concept of international socialism was enforced
with the Brezhnev Doctrine in Czechoslovakia in 1968. This
doctrine officially condoned the use of force in Eastern
Europe in order to challenge opponents of communism.
30A1though the SPD remained the leading coalition
partner until 1982, the discovery of Brandt's personal
assistant, Gunter Guillaume as an East German spy, led to
the chancellor's replacement in 1974 by Helmut Schmidt.
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economic, technological and scientific exchanges with the
Warsaw Pact nations.31

Perhaps even more important, Brandt

and other West German leaders were convinced that their
free-market, democratic state was inherently superior to the
East German model, and hoped that an improvement in interGerman relations would bring the East Germans to this
realization as well.
Coincident with the shift in West German policy towards
the GDR was a shift in Soviet policy toward the West.

This

shift further improved the climate for closer relations
between East and West Germany.

At the Warsaw Pact Summit

meeting held in Budapest during March of 1969, the Soviet
Union officially declared that it was time for stronger
East-West relations.
The USSR had several reasons for seeking detente.
According to Andrew Carter, the USSR's aims were to manage
the arms race, minimize the risk of nuclear confrontation,
and acquire time and means for economic progress.32

From

the FRG, the Soviets sought financial credits, technological
prowess and new markets for Soviet and East European goods.
The Soviet Union also wanted to reduce its economic
31Helmut Schmidt, "The Federal Republic of Germany
State of the Nation Address on 29 January 1976," Vital
Speeches 42 (15 March 1976):
325.
32Andrew Carter, "Detente and East-West Relations:
American Soviet and European Perspectives,11 in European
Detente:
Case Studies of the Politics of East-West
Relations, ed. Kenneth Dyson (London:
Frances Pinter,
1986), 61.
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assistance to the East German regime, which depended on the
USSR for subsidies, credits, resources and military support.
The GDR's period of isolation had forced it to become
heavily dependent on the Soviet Union, both economically and
politically.

This isolation and dependency proved to be

expensive for the Soviet Union, which saw the GDR as the
necessary gateway for the exchange of West German goods from
West to East.
The Soviets* interest in establishing better relations
with the FRG was favorably received in West Germany.

Bonn

appeared impressed by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's
presentation before the Supreme Soviet in July 1969 in which
he "expressed interest in improving Soviet-West German
relations and indicated a willingness to negotiate the
problem of West Berlin."33

Brandt knew that the road to

East Berlin was through Moscow.

The Soviet leaders had the

military and political power to control their East German
satellite, and Brandt hoped that by improving Soviet-West
German relations to put pressure on the reluctant SED to
establish official East-West German relations.

In addition

to seeking the long-term goal of reunification, Brandt
realized the potential for achieving immediate benefits in
the form of trade between the FRG as a producer of finished
products and the USSR as a provider of resources.

So, on 12

August 1970, West Germany and the Soviet Union signed the
33Korbel, "Ostpolitik:

I," 1056.
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Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics.

This treaty, also known as

the Ostvertrage. sought to improve relations between the FRG
and the USSR and led the way for the FRG to normalize
relations with the GDR.
In the early 1970s, Brandt expanded Ludwig Erhard's
Ostpolitik policy of improving West German relations with
the USSR and the Eastern European communist states.
Brandt's policies included a Deutschlandpolitik of
normalizing relations with the GDR and moving away from
coexistence towards cooperation with the East.

West German

Ostpolitik repudiated the Hallstein Doctrine and "cleared
away virtually all obstacles to the international
recognition of the GDR."34
Although reunification was still officially an
objective in West Germany's policy toward East Germany,
Chancellor Brandt no longer required that the reunification
issue or the German question be settled before relations
between the two states could occur.

As reunification became

more unlikely and division appeared more permanent,
normalization of relations and trade with the Eastern bloc
nations replaced reunification as the main controlling
element of the Federal Republic's foreign policy.

34J. F. Brown, Eastern Europe and Communist Rule.
(Durham:
Duke University Press, 1988), 239.
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Yet while Brandt began to drop the requirement of
reunification as the prerequisite for East-West German
relations, Ulbricht attempted to strengthen his policy of
limiting contacts between the two German states in order to
prevent the Western influence which was sure to threaten the
SED's hegemony.35

He realized that West Germany was an

attractive and desirable place for many East Germans.
Ulbricht feared the Soviet policy of rapprochement would
endanger East Germany's stability by revealing the
illegitimate nature of his regime.

However, as previously

mentioned, the USSR had decided that "the benefits of
rapprochement with West Germany outweighed the risks of
undermining the GDR's security."36

Clearly, the Soviet and

East German leaders had conflicting opinions of how East
Germany should conduct its relations with the Federal
Republic.
Aware that the Soviet Union's demands for rapprochement
with the West would be more dangerous to the GDR than the
USSR, Ulbricht felt that his state was sacrificing more than
the Soviet Union.

According to Ernest Plock:

The GDR was far less enthusiastic about the Soviet
Union's interest in West Germany's Ostpolitik.
For the
Russians the policy of intra-European detente promised
long-sought recognition of the Soviet Union's
35Ulbricht had already experienced the exodus of over
three million dissatisfied East Germans to West Germany,
which forced him to construct the Berlin Wall in August
1961.
36Ibid.
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preeminent position in Eastern Europe, but for the GDR
it posed the danger of isolation as West Germany, the
Soviet Union, and the Communist countries of Eastern
Europe dealt directly with each other.37
So, despite the prospect for international recognition,
Ulbricht feared that improved and strengthened East-West
German relations would be damaging to East German interests,
or more specifically would destabilize his regime.

Thus he

challenged the authority of the Soviet Union in order to
gain more political independence for the SED leaders.
Ulbricht continued to block Soviet initiatives during 1970
and 1971, obstructing rapprochement by harassing West German
transits and reducing their number to the GDR.38

He also

reiterated the SED's old demands that West Germany recognize
East Germany's sovereignty over West Berlin, acknowledge a
separate GDR citizenship, and, most importantly, grant full
recognition of East Germany as a legitimate and sovereign
state before any dialogue took place.

Ulbricht even dared

to go so far as placing "the GDR's status as a developed
socialist state on the same level as that of the Soviet
Union. »39
The Soviet leaders resented the SED leader's comparison
of the two states because the USSR considered itself to be

37Plock, 328.
38Lawrence L. Whetten, "Scope, Nature, and Change in
Inner-German Relations," International Affairs (London) 57
(Winter 1980-81):
67.
39Plock, 324.
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the vanguard communist state and the leader of the
international communist movement.

This comparison made

Ulbricht appear to the Soviet leaders as an extremely
arrogant individual.

By challenging the Soviet leaders,

Ulbricht not only posed a threat to the Soviet Union's role
as the vanguard communist country but also impeded the
progress of East and West rapprochement.
In May 1971, the Soviet Union took steps to end the
GDR's policy of isolation by forcing the removal of Ulbricht
as party secretary.40

Although Ulbricht officially

'resigned' from his post, numerous analysts suggest that his
removal was engineered by the Soviet Union.

The members of

the SED Politburo acknowledged the supremacy of their Soviet
patrons and realized that their own future also lay in the
Soviets' hands.

When the Soviet Politburo announced its

disapproval of Ulbricht to the SED leaders, they knew it was
time to follow the Soviets' lead and withdraw their

40A. James McAdams states in "The New Logic in SovietGDR Relations," Problems of Communism 37 (October 1988):
49, that this was after numerous reassurances by Leonid
Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders had repeatedly promised
the SED leader that Moscow would not compromise with the
West on the Berlin issue.
For the GDR to give up West
Berlin was to concede a loss to the FRG. Thus, Ulbricht
felt betrayed by the USSR.
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support.41

Left alone and without backing from his own

Politburo, Ulbricht had no choice but to resign.
When the United States and the Soviet Union called
for detente, East and West Germany responded differently.
Whereas the FRG and Brandt were ready and willing for
detente, the GDR under Ulbricht stubbornly objected to it.
Ulbricht resisted the Soviet policy changes, which he felt
gave total priority to the USSR's interests and endangered
the GDR's stability.

So, by failing to respond to the

Soviets' demands for improved East-West German relations,
Ulbricht presented himself as an impediment to detente and
Soviet interests and therefore was replaced as first
secretary in 1971.

This action affirmed Soviet hegemony

over the GDR and the SED and reinforced the illegitimacy of
the SED regime.

Thus, during the period of detente,

external factors allowed West Germany to pursue Ostpolitik
while compelling East Germany to respond to it.

However,

with Ulbricht gone, the new SED leader would do his best to
limit the damage of these newly established East-West German
relations.

41According to McAdams, "The New Logic in Soviet-GDR
Relations," 52, during the 1970s, the Soviet leader, Leonid
Brezhnev, had managed to consolidate his power effectively
and "judging from his central presence at the 24th CPSU
[soviet communist party] Congress in 1971, he could have
easily quashed any 'anti-detente' forces inclined to support
Ulbricht's position."

CHAPTER III
OFFICIAL EAST AND WEST GERMAN RELATIONS:

With the ouster of Ulbricht

1970s

as leader of the GDR, one

of the main domestic political impediments

to the

improvement of East Germany's relations with the FRG was
removed.

Although the SED leaders hope that relations with

West Germany would bolster their legitimacy, they remained
wary of the prospects for destabilization arising from
excessively close contact with the west.

So in the 1970s,

the SED government pursued a policy of limited expansion of,
relations with the FRG, in hopes of reaping the benefits of
improved intra-German contacts without incurring substantial
costs or risks.

At the same time, the East German regime

sought to increase and strengthen its ties to the Soviet
Union.
With Moscow's approval, Erich Honecker was elevated by
the Central Committee of the SED to the commanding position
of First Secretary in May 197l.42

Although he had

reservations about West Germany,Honecker did

not refrain

42Eric Waldman, "The German Democratic Republic:
Moscow's Faithful Ally,"
in East Central Europe:
Yesterday. Today. Tomorrow, ed. Milorad Drachkovitch
(Stanford: Hoover University Press, 1982), 272.
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from relations with the FRG.

He realized his own political

power rested in the hands of the Soviet leadership and that
he had been selected because leaders of the Soviet Union
perceived him to be more flexible and less intransigent than
his predecessor.

Therefore, Honecker implicitly followed

the Soviet Union*s lead for better East-West relations and
was obedient to Soviet leaders.

Honecker also sought

improved relations with the FRG for domestic political
reasons.

Unlike Ulbricht, he believed that contacts would

bolster the legitimacy of the East German regime.

The SED

would now try to acquire legitimacy through relations with
West Germany:

"The fact that the most popular and

'legitimizing' policy for the GDR was one involving closer
relations with the Federal Republic."43
Nevertheless, Honecker, as his predecessor Ulbricht,
feared the destabilizing consequences of Western penetration
into East German society.

He initiated the policy of

Abarenzuna. which emphasized that "contact with the Federal
Republic should be accompanied by an intensification of the
class war to ensure that the East German population is
uncontaminated by 'bourgeois influences.1"44

Honecker's

policy was aimed at blocking any West German influence that

43Brown, 99.
44W. T. Jones, "East Germany Under Honecker," World
Today (London) 32 (September 1976):
339.
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might destabilize the East German regime.

German expert

Henry Krisch explains Honecker's tactics:
With few exceptions, it has been the Honecker
leadership's policy to sever the ties, both substantive
and symbolic, that might tie the people of East Germany
to a larger Germany.
Thus East Germany believes that
the 'German question'. . . no longer exists.45
In a sense, Honecker's Abarenzung was similar to his
predecessor's policy but was hidden behind the mirage of
closer relations to the FRG.
Two agreements flowed from Ostpolitik that expanded
East and West German relations and increased West Germany's
influence on East Germany.46

First came the 1971 Berlin

Accords, or Quadripartite Agreement, signed in September by
the Soviet Union, United States, Great Britain and France.
The Berlin Accords reaffirmed West Berlin's ties to the
West? allowed for West Berliners to make regular visits to
East Berlin and the GDR; and promoted the development of
traffic and transportation discussions between the FRG and
West Berlin.47

The accords failed to provide East German

sovereignty over West Berlin and forced the SED to concede
West Germany's control over territory within the GDR.

45Henry Krisch, "The German Democratic Republic in the
Mid 1970s," Current History 70 (March 1976): 120.
46FRG Chancellor Brandt
laid the groundwork for the
1970 meetings in Kassel and

and GDR President Willy Stoph
GDR-FRG treaties through
their
Erfurt.

47Brown, 241, and Lawrence L. Whetten, Germany. East
and West:
Conflicts. Collaboration and Confrontation. (New
York:
New York University Press, 1981), 107.
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The next important agreement, ending the GDR's
international isolation, was reached in November 1972, when
the GDR and the FRG signed the Basic Treaty or
Grundvertrag.48

This treaty allowed the GDR to achieve de

facto recognition from Bonn, to get full recognition from
the world (in 1973, both German states joined the United
Nations), and permitted its citizens to have freer travel.
However, the GDR failed to obtain the FRG's recognition of
specific GDR citizenship, as well as full diplomatic
recognition.

The two governments exchanged only

representatives (permanent missions) and not ambassadors.
Brandt's Government maintained throughout the Basic
Treaty negotiations that the Federal Republic's relations
with the GDR were of a special nature and were not the same
as those with foreign countries.

According to the FRG, the

GDR was not seen as a foreign state and Bonn rejected the
idea of a full, internationally valid recognition of East
Germany.

Brandt offered the recognition of two separate

German states without sacrificing the idea of one German
nation.

He continued to stress the importance of self-

determination and free will for all German people.

In

essence, Brandt was trying to hold open the possibility of
eventual reunification at the same time that he extended
partial recognition.
48According to Plock, 5, the United States, Great
Britain, France and the Soviet Union intervened continuously
in the East and West German negotiations.
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Simultaneously, while East Germany was establishing
relations with the Federal Republic, the SED sought to
construct closer ties with the Soviet Union.

Honecker

supported the Soviet Union as the vanguard leader of the
socialist community of states, stating in May 1974, "We [GDR
and USSR] agree on all political, ideological, and basic
theoretical questions of social development."49

The GDR

continued to foster closer ties to the Soviet Union by
signing the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Aid in October
1975.
One important reason for strengthening relations with
the Soviets was Honecker's desire to make the two nations
increasingly economically interdependent.

Not only did the

USSR provide East Germany with most of its raw materials,
but the Soviet Union also granted many trade subsidies to
the GDR.

In return, East Germany provided the USSR with

many finished products and access to Western markets.
Honecker hoped to make the GDR economically indispensable to
the Soviet Union, thereby forcing the Soviet Union to
continue providing military and economic support to the SED
regime.50
Another reason Honecker sought better relations was to
49Stephen Bowers, "Continuity and Contrast:
Honecker's
Policy Toward the Federal Republic and West Berlin," World
Affairs 138 (Spring 1976):
324.
50Karl Cordell, "Soviet Attitudes Toward the German
Democratic Republic," Political Quarterly 61 (July/September
1990):
285.
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prevent the West from influencing the GDR*s citizens.
According to Peter Bender, the Grundvertraa forced East
Germany to admit a threatening competitor into its state.51
Now, East Germans would be confronted with a state whose
political system was based on popular support, and Honecker
feared that detente would increase the GDR's vulnerability
to the seductions of the West.52

Honecker hoped that by

establishing stronger East German-Soviet relations, the
Soviet Union's ideology, rather than West Germany's, would
be absorbed by the East Germans.
Detente brought both East and West German societies
closer through various means.

Guidelines for transportation

of goods between the two German states were created.

The

exchange of media personnel occurred; of course, the GDR set
restrictions on the kind and amount of news that could be
reported but it did allow West German journalists to operate
in East Germany.

Communications between Germans were

improved by increasing the number of telephone lines and
postal services available.

Perhaps even more importantly,

detente reinforced the obvious fact that both states
contained Germans who shared many common things:

the German

language, beliefs, traditions, ideas, values, family and
friends.

George Kennan observed that Germans believe in

51Peter Bender, "The Special Relationship of the Two
German States," World Today (London) 29 (September 1973):
389-90.
52Ibid. , 389.
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what he coined "romantic linguistic nationalism” in which a
common tongue creates a community.53
Nonetheless, despite all these commonalities, the two
German states did not share a common system of government.
The East German regime tried desperately to emphasize and
reinforce the differences between the two German states
through demarcation.

Fearing the destabilizing influences

of West German society, Honecker perpetuated Ulbricht's 1961
'two-culture' doctrine which stated that "East and West
Germany belonged to two entirely separate cultural spheres,
one progressive and humanistic, the other reactionary and
imperialistic."54

The East German communists saw the FRG's

cultural policy as antagonistic, whose purpose was to
destroy the socialist order.55

The SED attempted to

downplay the common cultural and historical ties with West
Germany and sought to stress the GDR's socialist
distinctions and the superiority of a social welfare
state.56

In 1971, the SED's chief ideologist Kurt Hager

asserted in a speech that Marxist-Leninism and the supremacy

53Michael Meyer, "The Myth of German Unity:
Divisions
Between East and West Will Persist," Newsweek 9 July 1990,
37.
540rlow, 331.
55Eberhard Schulz, ed., GDR: Foreign Policy. (New York:
M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1982), 161.
56Griffith, 242.
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of the working class and party were to be emphasized.57
The SED intensified its communist propaganda in an attempt
at self-legitimation and to counter any Western ideas which
penetrated East German society.
Once again, external factors in the form of Soviet and
West German pressures affected the policies of the East
German regime.

In the end, the GDR exchanged a foreign

policy gain for a domestic policy loss.

Although the SED

did gain international recognition by most states, it now
was forced to accept the consequences of West German
penetration into East German society.

Honecker realized the

potential damage that West German influence could bring to
East Germany.

So, although Honecker was unable to prevent

Western infiltration, he sought to control and manage it
through his policy of Abarenzuna. which included
strengthening ties to the Soviet Union while minimizing
relations with West Germany.

However, as revealed in the

next chapter, Western penetration continued to delegitimize
Honecker1s SED regime.

57J o n e s ,

340.

CHAPTER IV
WEST GERMAN PENETRATION INTO EAST GERMANY

The penetration of Western ideas into the GDR was
furthered by detente, Ostpolitik, and the Basic Treaty.

The

introduction of Western democratic and free-market concepts
presented economic, social and political alternatives to
East Germany’s repressive and restrictive communist system.
It is apparent that foreign contact with the Western states
through financial, human and technical exchanges intensified
East Germans1 dissatisfaction with their communist
controlled state and reinforced the illegitimate nature of
the SED government.
The first form of penetration was economic.

Before the

conclusion of the Basic Treaty of 1972, intra-German trade
did exist.

The Frankfurt Agreement of October 1949 and the

Berlin Agreement of September 1951 provided a foundation for
trade between the two states.58

Following these agreements

came the Treaty of Rome and the establishment of the
European Common Market in which the FRG insisted that the
GDR be included.

The inclusion of the GDR extended "Bonn's

right to treat West German-East German trade as an inter58Korbel, "Ostpolitik:

I," 1064.
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zonal arrangement” which would allow the East's exports to
enter into the West free of customs duties.59
For different reasons, both governments placed
considerable importance on intra-German trade.

For the

Federal Republic trade was both a political and moral issue.
Despite the conventional wisdom that West German leaders
wanted to use trade as a bargaining leverage to achieve
reunification, it was not used as one, at least not in the
short term.

The GDR continued to receive economic benefits

without being forced to make any substantial concessions to
the FRG.

Of course in the long term, the ultimate West

German goal was to use trade and personal contacts to
penetrate East German society in order to pave the way for
reunification.

But until the reunification, the Federal

Republic felt a moral obligation to help the Germans living
in the GDR.

Essentially, the FRG sought to improve the

quality of life for the East Germans through enhancing the
flow of economic resources between the two Germanies.
East Germany, on the other hand, needed intra-German
trade for both economic and political reasons.

Relations

with the FRG were critical to the GDR's economic prosperity
which in turn, helped to maintain the regime's political
stability.

The SED regime's effort to gain legitimacy

depended on its ability to satisfy its claim of the GDR
being a separate and superior —
59Ibid. , 1065.

economically as well as
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politically —

German state.

According to Henry Krisch,

economic growth was used as the major legitimating device
for the SED regime.60

Therefore, the GDR had to provide

the people with a standard of living which was at least
greater than that in other socialist countries.

Honecker

knew this and throughout his tenure sought to increase the
standard of living for East Germans by stressing a more
consumer-oriented policy.

This pro-consumer policy, which

Honecker initiated at the 8th Party Congress of the SED in
1971, set out to increase the standard of living and the
number of goods available for sale in the GDR.

As Krisch

states, although communist regimes, such as the GDR, "may
not strive for legitimate acceptance by the whole
population, they do seek to evoke legitimate responses from
ever-larger numbers of people.”61

So, the SED intended to

use economic policies to gain popular support.
The numerous benefits provided by the FRG helped
maintain the G D R 1s economic achievements:
West German subsidies of the East German economy [came]
in the form of credits, visa, toll payments,
construction assistance, private transfers, trade, and
other forms of assistance [including the swing credit
or an interest-free loan which allowed East Germany to
avoid paying hard currency for many West German
imports] ,62
60Krisch,

"Political Legitimation," 115.

61Ibid., 113.
62Karen Dawisha, Eastern Europe. Gorbachev and Reform:
The Great Challenge. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University
Press), 114-15.

46
Special currency terms provided by the FRG to the GDR which
equated one Ostmark to one Deutschemark (DM) also helped
bolster the GDR's economy.

In addition, the West German

government paid cash to the SED regime in exchange for the
freedom of some East German dissidents.

According to West

German sources, from 1962 to 1979, approximately 16,000 GDR
prisoners were purchased by West Germany for over $5 million
in cash and goods.63
Furthermore, the introduction of the Deutschemark into
East Germany provided additional income for the SED regime.
The GDR government went so far as to create hard currency
stores called "Intershops" which only accepted payments in
Deutschemarks and brought in an estimated 700-800 million DM
annually to the GDR.64

The Deutschemark became a second

currency for the GDR and in some transactions was the only
acceptable currency.
The FRG also provided East Germany with technological
improvements.

In fact, one of the major reasons the Soviet

leaders called for detente was because of the need for
economic modernization in the USSR and in its satellites,
which they felt could be achieved through technological
means.

According to analyst Andrew Carter, "increased

access to Western technology could give the planned

63Richard Starr, Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe.
4th ed., (Stanford:
Hoover Press Publications, 1982), 112.
64Waldman, 277.

economies a short cut to modernization that would lessen the
need for structural reform."65

Under Honecker, in the

G D R 's highly centralized economy, substantial systemic
reforms did not take place.

Although economic changes were

introduced in the 1970s, these changes were geared to finetuning the socialist system, not changing it.

Instead of

systemic reform, the GDR sought to bolster its economy
through "more diversified trade with the industrialized and
technologically developed West."66

Soon after signing the

Basic Treaty, the FRG became the GDR's second largest
trading partner (after the Soviet Union) and supplied East
Germany with hi-tech goods and information.
West German economic contacts certainly bolstered the
performance of the GDR's economy, which appeared strong and
healthy on the surface.

In fact, the Soviet and the SED

leaderships claimed that the GDR was an economic miracle,
and that was also the conventional wisdom adhered to by
Westerners.

Up until the mid-1980s, the social contract

between the government and the people (which guaranteed the
workers a secure, non-competitive work environment with wage
increases in return for political compliance) seemed
successful on the surface.

However, the truth was that the

GDR's economic situation was not as favorable as it

65Carter, 59.
66Korbel, "Ostpolitik:

II," 341.

48
appeared.67

In the end, West German economic contacts

could not prop up an increasingly inefficient planned
economy.
The GDR*s economic system faltered for several reasons.
First, the GDR was vulnerable to external economic
destabilization.

In the mid-1970s, the drastic fluctuations

in oil-prices, U.S. inflation and Soviet stagnation created
an undesirable economic climate for the GDR.

By the late

1970s, the Soviet Union could no longer continue to provide
as many economic concessions to the GDR, which made it
increasingly difficult for the SED regime to maintain its
consumer-oriented economic policy.

Furthermore, according

to Doris Cornelson of the German Institute for Economic
Research in Berlin, "the world-wide increase in raw
materials and energy prices only too quickly put an end to
this [the GDR's] period of undisturbed economic
development."68

So, East Germany had to pay more for its

imports while its prices for export items did not rise
accordingly.

The SED regime had become a hostage to

economic forces that were beyond its control.

67Many analysts question the accuracy and credibility
of the economic figures that the East German state provided
to the West.
68Doris Cornelson, "The GDR in a Period of Foreign
Trade Difficulties:
Development and Prospects for the
1980's," in East European Economic Assessment:
Part 1 Country Studies. 1980. by the Joint Economic Committee 1981,
299-300.
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In addition to external shocks, the GDR suffered from
internal economic distortions arising from problems within
the GDR's central planning system.

The basic nature of the

planning system led to its failure for numerous reasons:

1)

it focused on quantity not quality and therefore produced
low-quality goods; 2) it promoted politically reliable but
economically inept managers with its nomenklatura list? 3)
it granted egalitarian wages and job security and thus
failed to provide incentives; 4) it encouraged managers to
set low targets for production? 5) it was extremely wasteful
in the utilization of resources? and 6) it offered no
competition or competitive elements.

In addition, the East

German economy suffered from the same repressed inflation,
under-investment and price distortions as the other
communist bloc nations.
The problems of central planning led East Germans to
turn to an alternative route.

Their interests became

focused on a second (black) market which damaged the already
fragile, official one.

While the black market benefitted

the East German consumer by providing goods not available on
the official East German market, the GDR suffered the
consequences.

First, many of the goods were stolen state

properties and East Germany did not profit from the
transactions.

Second, the exchanges of currency were not

taxed and revenue was lost for the GDR.

Third, the option

to buy higher quality Western goods reduced the number of
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East German goods purchased, and once again, the state lost
revenue.

Finally, the official economy lost worker

productivity as East German workers turned to the black
market for income and failed to show up at work.
In addition to the destabilizing effects created by the
black market came the effects of the increasing influx of
West German Deutschemarks.

In fact, the DM ultimately

proved destabilizing because it dealt a debilitating blow to
the East Germans by making them conscious of the fact that
their currency was inferior to the West German mark.

This

reality reinforced the illegitimate nature of the SED regime
along with its propaganda of being a superior economic
state.
So, although the GDR appeared successful by East
European economic standards, it could not compete with West
Germany's progress.

The East German population continued to

compare its successes with those of the FRG, and the GDR
lagged far behind the FRG in most areas.

According to one

report, the GDR trailed behind the FRG in many consumer
goods:
Table 1.— standard of Living in FRG and GDR
GDR
H
O
o
o

per capital income
newspapers
own cars
own phones
color t.v.

FRG
20,000
125
97%
98/100
94%

69

39
25%
7/100
52%

69,lReport on GDR," C-Span News, 11 April 1990, 4 p.m.
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In the GDR, where success was measured by economic
achievement, the numbers revealed that Honecker's brand of
consumer-socialism could not compete with the FRG.

This

fact carried delegitimizing implications for the SED regime
and its proclamations of the superiority of its economic
system.

With the FR G 1s successful economic penetration into

East German society, the East Germans discovered that they
were being deprived of consumer goods and services which
were readily available in western nations.
West German social and political penetration came in
various forms.

The first form of penetration was the

exchange of travellers, both East and West.70

As West

Germans travelled to the GDR, they were able to share with
the East Germans their stories, ideas and values.71

In

return, beginning in late 1964, a limited number of East
Germans, mostly elderly, were allowed to travel to the West
and see the world on the other side of the Wall for
themselves.72

The SED regime allowed the exchange of

visitors primarily for economic reasons.

The communist

regime received money from individuals entering East

70The number of East Germans travelling westward was
far less than the number of West Germans travelling
eastward.
The GDR also restricted travel for youths while
tolerating travel for pensioners.
71Brown reports, 252, that in 1979 some eight million
West Germans travelled to East Germany.
72According to Brown, 239, by 1987, one million East
Germans had visited and experienced the FRG.
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Germany, as well as from the West German government for
allowing East and West Germans travel privileges.73

Yet

although the exchange of visitors brought economic benefits
to the GDR, it violated the basic intention of the Berlin
Wall which was to keep out Western influences.74
The second form of Western penetration came via
literature, radio, and television.

Although the SED

government strictly prohibited "the importation of printed
material of nonsocialist origin," West German social and
political literature was still circulated through various
circles.75

This type of penetration was perhaps the

easiest type for the SED leaders to control since they
decided what would and would not be imported into the GDR.
Due to the technological advances in communications,
Western influences via the air waves, such as radio and
television, were more difficult to control.

East Germany

received not only West German radio programs but also the
pro-democratic programs aired by Voice of America and Radio
Free Europe.

Now, the East Germans heard news reports which

^Of course, there was a price for West Germans to pay.
Since 1964, West Germans had to exchange, at a rate of one
to one, their West German Deutschemark for the less valuable
East German Ostmark.
74In November 1973 and October 1980, the SED regime
doubled the amount of the visitors entrance fee. According
to Bowers, 320, this move "raised Western suspicions that
the real intention of this action was to reduce the number
of Wester visitors coming to the GDR."
^Waldman, 279.
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offered political, social and economic alternatives for them
to compare to their local ones.
Television, however, made the greatest impression on
East German society.

Although reluctant at first, by the

mid-1970s Honecker abandoned his effort to prevent East
Germans from viewing West German television, and by 1989 he
had made it accessible to all East Germans.76

The possible

impact of Western television seems obvious.
Analyst J. F. Brown suggests several reasons why
Honecker tolerated television:

it would be technically

difficult to block the reception of West German programs and
even if it could be done, it would be a self-inflicting
propaganda defeat to do so? the East Germans hopefully would
view West German television to be condemning the Western
lifestyle; and finally, the acceptance of West German
television was a gesture of the regime's understanding for
the FRG society and showed the communists' confidence in
their ability to withstand any ill effects.77
To counter any disturbances that television might
bring, Honecker reacted by increasing the levels of
communist propaganda.

Nevertheless, even the SED elite

watched West German television and used it for their main

76Tara Sonenshine, "The Revolution Has Been Televised,"
the Washington Post. 2 October 1990, 19(A).
^Brown, 253.
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source of entertainment and news.78

Despite the

government's efforts to contain the impact of Western
television, it appeared that East German propaganda had
little affect on the GDR's citizens.

As T. H. Rigby

acknowledges:
The unintended consequences of . . . technological
changes may not only generate 'undesirable' indigenous
changes in social beliefs and values but render society
more open and receptive to beliefs and values current
in the non-communist world, primarily those of
'bourgeois' origin.79
Television only reinforced the illegitimate nature of
Honecker's regime by presenting the East Germans with
alternate choices.
Honecker underestimated television's potential impact
on his fellow East German viewers.

This technology provided

the East Germans with a view of life outside the wall.
Through television, the East German population could view
the changes and reforms occurring in other nations.

They

watched glasnost in the USSR under the radical Gorbachev;
they saw the possibility of free elections in Hungary and
Poland.

A worker from Leipzig remarked:

"We saw what

Poland and Hungary were doing; we heard Gorbachev.
felt, Why are we being left behind?"80

Everyone

West German

78C. Bradley Scharf, Politics and Change in East
Germany. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), 128.
79Rigby, 18.
80Karsten Prager, A State, Not a Nation," Time, 27
November 1989, 41.
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television even allowed the East Germans to view themselves
protesting.

During the celebration of the GDR's fortieth

anniversary as an independent state, policemen beat several
hundred East German government protestors.

That same

evening, the violent acts were aired back to East Germans
through West German television.
West German television also undermined the SED
government's legitimacy by appealing to what A. J. McAdams
calls the East Germans "pent-up consumerism."81

Despite

the SED regime's confidence, West Germany's way of life
proved to be more attractive to East Germans and
"inevitably, the West German popular and consumer culture
began to play an insidious and important role in East German
life, countering both communist ideology and the GDR's
separate pretentions."82

Coinciding with the East Germans'

growing material aspirations came the SED regime's
difficulties in sustaining increases in living standards for
the population.

This created legitimacy problems for

Honecker who could not satisfy the heightened expectations
of the population.83
West German media penetration also frustrated the
GDR's attempts to restructure the German culture into two
separate and distinct cultures, and thereby failed to shore
81As quoted in Sonenshine, 19(A).
82Brown, 253.
83Krisch, "Political Legitimacy," 114.
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up the SED's legitimacy.

As analyst Ernest Plock suggests,

attempts to maintain a separate East German culture were
doomed by the West German media:
at cultural isolation failed.

HTo be sure, these efforts

The common language and ready

availability of West Germany radio and television in most
parts of the GDR assured that news from the West would
continue to reach East Germany."84

By the early 1980s, not

only West Germany but now East Germany respected the notion
of a common German people, and German nationalism surged. ,
Honecker's attempt at deGermanization had failed.
German Bundestag member Walther Kiep observed:

As West

"The quest

for new ideals and opportunities for personal identification
[wa]s leading Germans back to their own history and public
discussion of 'national awareness,1 'homeland,'
'fatherland,' and 'nation.'85

By 1983, when East Germany

celebrated the 500th birthday of Martin Luther and
acknowledged a history similar to West Germany's, the
earlier doctrine of two Germanies with two different
histories was "visibly disavowed."86
The influx of West German citizens, literature, radio
and television into the GDR provided the East Germans with
options not available in the closed communist society.

On a

84Plock, 331.
85Kiep, 316.
86Richard Lowenthal, "The German Question Transformed,"
Foreign Affairs 63 (Winter 1984-85):
312.
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1980 Fellowship in Berlin Lucy Komisar reported that few, if
any, East Germans believed the SED's communist propaganda
anymore.87

By tolerating West German penetration, the

Honecker regime allowed the East German population to see
that the West Germans possessed things that they lacked:
independent wealth; freedom of travel and expression; the
right to protest against their government's policies; and
the opportunity to make decisions about their lifestyles
independent from the state's desires.

Political scientist

Karen Dawisha theorized that the attractiveness of MarxismLeninism would be reduced so long as it was the West and not
the USSR setting the standards of human rights, consumer
welfare and technological competence.88
In sum, the combination of economic, human and
technological West German penetration weakened the SED
regime and prevented it from gaining legitimacy, impelling
it to maintain itself solely through force.

It appeared

that without force, the regime could certainly collapse.
Certainly Honecker realized the adverse consequences that
this Western penetration could bring.
also realized the advantages.

At the same time, he

Therefore, Honecker tried to

manage and control the amount of West German influence in
East German society.

However, after viewing the effects of

87L. Komisar, "Cold War News in West Germany," Nation
2 30 (5 January 198 0):
11.
88Dawisha, 24.
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West German penetration on East Germany, it is evident
Honecker failed to shield East Germans from life in the
democratic, capitalist country and also failed in his
propaganda attempts to prove the GDR's superiority over the
FRG.

These failures helped erode the SED regime's control

over the thoughts and actions of its people and thus added
to the regime's illegitimacy.

CHAPTER V
GERMAN DETENTE:

1980s

In the early 1970s, when the Soviet leadership pressed
for detente, the SED regime initially resisted.

By the

early 1980s their positions had reversed, and now the SED
leaders were pushing for continued detente over the USSR's
objection.

Although Honecker had reservations concerning

detente, he was also convinced that the improving
relationship with West Germany brought substantial benefits
to the GDR.

In his opinion, the benefits of the

relationship outweighed the risks.

At the same time,

Honecker believed that the GDR had become an indispensable
economic asset to the Soviet Union and therefore felt
justified in continuing the inner-German dialogue.

So,

despite the United States and the Soviet Union's
increasingly antagonistic relationship, the East and West
German governments succeeded in maintaining their bilateral
relationship.
Soviet-American detente began to wither as early as
1975. Tensions mounted when the Soviets began a series of
proxy wars in Africa and the Near East.

The era of detente

finally ended with a series of international events:
59

the
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Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979? NATO's 1979
announcement of its dual-track policy which would bring
cruise and Pershing 2 missiles to the FRG; and the
imposition of martial law in Poland in 1981.

Yet despite

the intensification of East-West tensions and the USSR's
demands for its East European allies to reduce their
relations with the western, democratic nations, Honecker's
regime managed to preserve its ties to the Federal Republic.
As early as February 1980, Schmidt and Honecker officially
"exchanged reassurances that the erosion of detente at the
bilateral great power level should not affect relations
between the two Germanies."89
Both economic and political factors provided the
rationale behind Erich Honecker's desires to continue the
little detente with West Germany.

Economic motivations

played a critical role in Honecker's decision to pursue
conciliatory policies with the FRG as the GDR benefitted
disproportionately from the inner-German economic
relationship.90

To begin with, the GDR relied heavily on

the FRG as a trading partner.

By the early 1980s, West

Germany's trade with the GDR was about 2 percent of the
FRG's total imports and exports, while East Germany's trade

89Whetten, "Scope, Nature, and Change in Inner-German
Relations," 75.
90This is not to say that the FRG did not benefit from
the economic relationship but that its importance w a s ■
limited.
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with the FRG was about 12 percent of the GDR's total foreign
trade.91

Honecker believed that this economic relationship

was vital to the health and stability of the SED government
because it helped forestall discontent among the East German
population.

The SED regime hoped that the inner-German

relationship would diminish the increasing economic gap
between East and West Germany, and thereby increase its
indigenous support.
The GDR relied on the FRG for a number of services and
goods and was reluctant to renounce these economic benefits.
Each year, the SED leaders sought to gain more credits from
the FRG.

A. J. McAdams reported in 1983 that the GDR's

foreign debt, of Which nearly half was owed directly or
indirectly to the FRG, had risen to almost $13 billion.92
After COMECON, West Germany was the most important export
market for the GDR.

And German political analyst Lawrence

Whetten claims that the GDR's trade with other Western
nations was falling, citing:

"This sharp decline in trade

with other Western countries . . . has been offset to some
extent by marginal increases in German trade."93

91Jonathan Dean, "Directions in Inner-German
Relations," Orbis 29 (Fall 1985), 623.
92A. J. McAdams, "Bridging the German Divide in a Time
of Tension," New Leader 66 (3 October 1983), 10.
93Whetten, "Scope, Nature and Change in Inner-German
Relations," 73.
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Furthermore, the East Germans suffered from their raw
materials dependency on the Soviet Union.

Since 1981, the

Soviet Union had hit East Germany with increased petroleum
prices as the result of inflation and the world economic
downturn.94

As the USSR reduced its supplies and subsidies

to the GDR, the SED government could not afford to reduce
its trade relationship with the Federal Republic.
economic loss would be too great.

The

According to one source,

the GDR received an annual estimated hard currency gain of
DM 5 billion from the inner-German relationship.95
So, although Honecker recognized and tried to manage
the potentially destabilizing effects the improving innerGerman relationship brought to the GDR, he also realized how
economic prosperity would advance his consumer-oriented
policy and continue his regime stability.

Honecker

obviously thought that the economic benefits gained from the
inner-German trade relationship outweighed the possible
consequences that increased West German contact with East
German society brought.
Political reasons for continuing the inner-German
dialogue played a role for both the East and West German
regimes.

The West German government and population still

spoke of reunification.

In the ideal world of politics

reunification was the goal; however, in the realistic world
94Dean, 623.
95Ibid. , 617.
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of politics, reunification, considering the relationship of
the superpowers at the time, seemed impossible.

As Richard

Lowenthal states:
The immense majority of Germans have long realized that
such reunification could only happen if all Europe were
reunited by the release of the East European nations
from Soviet control.96
Nevertheless, this did not prevent West Germans from
continuing to hope for reunification.

The cultural

similarities between the two states continued to reaffirm a
common German heritage.

Although the circumstances were not

right for reunification, Germans still aspired towards it as
a long term goal.
Honecker also had a political motivation for continuing
the inner-German detente.
stability at home.

He sought to maintain his

As long as East Germany continued to

trade with West Germany, Honecker believed his citizens
would remain submissive;

however, if he reduced inner-

German relations, it could stir up unrest.
government official Walther Kiep noted:

As West German

"The East German

communists ha[d] failed to bring about any general
acceptance of its claim to legitimacy in the German
context", and they saw the inner-German relationship as one
way to get it.97

96Lowenthal, 304.
97Kiep, 322.
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While East and West Germany continued their
relationship, strains grew in US-USSR relations.

As the

American-Soviet intermediate-range nuclear force (INF)
missile conflict emerged, distrust and hostility between the
two superpowers deepened.

In retaliation against the

deployment of Soviet SS-2 0 intermediate nuclear range
weapons in Europe and East Asia, the Carter Administration
introduced NATO's dual-track policy.

With this policy, the

US government sought to establish negotiations with the
Soviets regarding their build up of SS-20s in Eastern
Europe, while continuing with plans to position Pershing 2
and cruise missiles (GLCMs) in Western Europe.

Both East

and West Germany were to receive missiles from their
respective alliance partners and were expected to follow
their allies' wishes of down-playing the inter-German
relationship; however, both German regimes wished to
continue their bilateral relationship and attempted to
detach it from the Soviet-American arms race.
In October 1982, the Christian Democrats (CDU), led by
Chancellor Helmut Kohl, replaced the Social Democrats (SPD)
as the leading partner in West Germany's new CDU/CSU-FDP
coalition government.

During their thirteen year absence

from power, the Christian Democrats had been extremely
critical of the Social Democrats Deutschlandoolitik.

The

conservatives complained that the Social Democrats granted
too many concessions to the East German regime while
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receiving few in return.

Now, the new Center-Right

coalition claimed it would seek more advantages for West
Germany from East Germany in the form of humanitarian
concessions by the SED government.

However, under Kohl's

leadership, West Germany's Deutschlandoolitik appeared quite
similar to that of his predecessors.

Besides continuing to

foster ties with East Germany and acknowledging all past
treaties, Kohl's objectives included "the all-German aspects
of the FRG's national ideology and included the theme of
reunification and self-determination of the German
people."98

The Christian Democrats realized that detente

brought good things to both Germanies.

According to

political scientist A. J. McAdams:
Detente gave them [West Germans] a much desired avenue
to the reunification of long separated families, to
substantial increases in communications, and above all,
to the opening of routine contacts among citizens of
the divided nation.99
Chancellor Kohl also realized that by continuing the
policies originated by the Social Democrats, the Christian
Democrats would reduce the SPD's opportunities to criticize
his government and policies.

The SPD's past policies had

proved popular with West Germans.

Chancellor Kohl did not

wish to alter them and risk the popularity of his regime.
Thus, despite the worsening of superpower relations, policy

98Frey, 111.
"McAdams,

"Bridging the German Divide," 10.
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continuity actually helped carry on and even improve
relations between the two German states.100
In East Germany, Honecker followed the Soviet Union's
lead and voiced anti-missile rhetoric about the United
States and its allies.

Two months before the West German

Bundestag's 22 November 1983 vote to accept US missiles, the
East German communist leader warned of a possible "ice age"
in inter-German relations.

However, after the vote,

Honecker abandoned his threats and took a more accommodating
approach.

Emphasizing the need to "limit" any damage

resulting from the Bundestag's decision, he left "open the
possibility of a return to detente."101

Honecker, like

Kohl, wanted to maintain the inter-German relationship.
According to Jonathan Dean, an American negotiator on the
1971 Berlin Agreement, "the Kohl-Honecker collaboration to
try to salvage the inner-German relation and even to
intensity [sic] it . . . received overwhelming approval from
the public in both German states."102

Both German

populations wanted to continue the benefits gained through
detente and persisted in hoping for reunification.

100According to Ronald Asmus, "East and West Germany:
Continuity and Change," World Today (London) 40 (April
1984), 145, Soviet-American relations worsened with "the
shooting down by the Russians of the Korean airliner, the
continuing stalemate in Geneva, and the American invasion of
Grenada."
101Ibid. , 149.
102Dean, 621-22.
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In addition East and West Germans shared the widespread
fear of a nuclear holocaust.

The GDR represented the Warsaw

Treaty Organization’s front-line state and the FRG
represented N A T O ’s front-line state, making both states
first to suffer during an attack.

President Reagan's

commitment to the possibility of conducting a limited
nuclear war in Europe intensified East and West German
anxieties.103

Neither state wished to be the battleground

for the Americans and Soviets to act out their disputes.
So, despite the collapse of superpower talks on the
intermediate-range nuclear forces in November 1983, the
arrival of missiles in West Germany, and the deployment of
new Soviet short range missiles in both the GDR and
Czechoslovakia, East and West Germany continued their own
detente.104

Both Germanies sought peace and believed that

it was their duty to ensure it.

The leaders claimed that

international peace would continue only if they made the
effort.

East and West German leaders hoped to set a

peaceful example for their respective alliances to follow.
Meanwhile, the Soviets reacted harshly towards the
Federal Republic for attempting to strengthen its special
relationship with the GDR.

They charged the FRG with

aggressive behavior and "revanchism," which political
103Frey, 78.
104Edwina Moreton, "All Quiet on the German Front?
Germany in the Post-detente Era," Government and Opposition
19 (Autumn 1984):
441.

scientist Arthur Hanhardt, Jr. defines as "a code word for
alleged West German efforts to alter the status quo in postWorld War II Europe."105

The Soviet leaders claimed that

Kohl was attempting to use economic incentives to lure the
East German state into the capitalist world.

In June of

1983 and July of 1984, the GDR received private bank loans,
guaranteed for the first time by the West German government,
of DM 1 billion ($370 million) and DM 950 million ($330
million).106

Thus, the Soviet leaders felt that the FRG

and GDR were strengthening relations behind their back.
Nor did the SED regime escape Soviet criticism for its
part in the inner-German dialogue.

Articles appeared in the

Soviet Pravda and Izvestia in July and August 1984
criticizing Honecker for continuing discussions with the
West German government and for accepting loans from the FRG
which could undermine the SED governments stability.107
Nevertheless, Honecker disregarded the Soviet criticism
directed at his regime and continued with plans for a future
visit to West Germany.

According to Hanhardt, "East

105Arthur M. Hanhardt Jr., "The Prospects for GermanGerman Detente," Current History 83 (November 1984):
380.
106During the inter-German negotiations, CSU leader
Frank Josef Strauss represented the FRG.
Before the loan
agreements, Strauss was a predominant critic of the SPD's
past policy which provided economic aid to the GDR without
strings.
Ironically, when the loans were made to the GDR,
it was revealed that there were few, if any, real
concessions made by the SED.
107Hanhardt, 380.
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Germany's SED leaders reacted with cool determination.
Neues, Deutschland and the provincial East German press
refused to publish the full texts of the Soviet
broadsides."108

Honecker's disregard for the Soviets'

propaganda was a measure of how much East Germany had come
to depend on its relationship with West Germany.

In a

matter of a few years, Honecker, who at first had doubts
about contacts with the West Germans, now insisted on
defying the Soviets and conducting business with the West
Germans.
Honecker ignored Soviet pressure to back away from
autonomous relations with the FRG.

The SED leader was able

to withstand Soviet pressure for several reasons.

According

to A. J. McAdams, Honecker*s strong position in the
Politburo and foreign and domestic policy successes (good
relations with FRG and the economy in an upswing) enabled
him to consolidate his power at home.109

At the same time,

the USSR's leadership was weak due to the deaths of Leonid
Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov and the incompetent administration
under Konstantin Chernenko.

Also, the East German regime

was receiving tacit support from other Eastern European
states— Poland, Hungary, Romania and sometimes Bulgaria—

108Ibid. , 388.
109McAdams, "The New Logic in Soviet-GDR

Relations," 52.
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states which benefitted economically from the inner-German
relationship.110
There remains little doubt that Soviet influence over
East Germany had begun to wane by the early 1980s.

When the

conservative Soviet Ambassador, Abrassimov, was removed from
the GDR in July 1983 and replaced by a German expert,
Kotchemassov, it appeared that the Soviet leadership was
allowing Honecker more autonomy in conducting East Germany's
affairs with West Germany.

On the other hand, it would be a

mistake to assert that the GDR had gained complete autonomy
from Soviet influence in the realm of inner-German policy.
For example, the USSR did manage to force Honecker to
postpone his visit to West Germany in 1984.111

The Soviets

felt that this visit would affirm approval of the INF
deployment and be construed as acceptance of the new NATOWTO status quo.112

The Soviet leaders believed that

110Moreton, 448.
111According to Dean, 612-13, the USSR had Honecker
announce old demands, also known as the 1980 Gera Demands,
as the reason for his postponement. These demands read as
follows:
First, the SED sought for West Germany to respect
a separate East German citizenship; second, the SED wanted
to make the GDR and the FRG's permanent missions into
diplomatic embassies and thus receive full diplomatic
recognition of East Germany
by West Germany; third, theSED
wanted the German border to
be along the middle and notthe
western bank of the Elbe River; and finally, the SED wanted
the West German information center in Salzgitter, which
collected human rights abuses against the SED regime,
closed.
The Gera demands were aimed at increasing the GDR's
sovereignty while detaching
it from the West.
112Hanhardt, 388.
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Honecker*s actions threatened to weaken Soviet hegemony in
Eastern Europe.

As political analyst Eric Frey concludes:

"Moscow intervened against the inter-German thaw because it
feared to lose control over its European empire."113
Yet although the USSR officially reprimanded the SED
leaders for their conduct, this action did not indicate that
the Soviets rejected inner-German dialogue.
affairs analyst Ronald Asmus reveals:

As German

"Moscow has thus far

tolerated a certain 'decoupling' in inter-German relations
from both the INF issues and broader east-west trends."114
The Soviet Union did not want the GDR to refrain from its
inner-German relationship but only from making policy
decisions independent of the USSR.
No doubt the Soviets believed that East German
stability would help to ensure Soviet domination in the
communist bloc.

As instability in Poland grew because of

actions of the independent trade union, Solidarity, the
Soviets realized that it was crucial to maintain the SED
regime's stability.

One way for the SED government to

remain stable was to keep the East Germans acquiescent.

The

Soviets knew this and realized that inner-German relations
should continue but on Soviet and not just East German
terms.

East European expert Edwina Moreton explains:

113Frey, 135.
114Asmus, 145.
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Even the row between East Germany and the Soviet Union
. . . still appear[ed] to be largely about tactics for
getting the best deal for a separate East Germany out
of neighboring West Germany, rather than any more
fundamental clash over long-term aims with respect to
West Germany."115
So, by refusing to allow Honecker's visit to the Federal
Republic, the USSR confirmed that the SED was limited in its
ability to deviate from Soviet policy.
Just as the Soviet Union was concerned with East
Germany's role in the inter-German detente, so too was the
United States concerned with West Germany's position.

Even

with West Germany's Bundestag voting to accept US missiles,
many conservative American politicians remained upset with
West Germany's leaders for continuing economic transactions
and political negotiations with Honecker's communist regime.
The Reagan Administration perceived the FRG to be taking a
separate route as West Germany's relationship with the
United States "was no longer one of submission, but one of
strong and sometimes highly competitive partners who clashed
repeatedly over military and economic issues."116

American

politicians raised questions regarding the Federal
Republic's loyalty to NATO and West European security.
Conservatives dreaded the possible consequences of the
inter-German relationship, in the form of the rebirth of a
single German nation whose past revealed it to be an

115Moreton, 440.
116Frey, 68.
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aggressive and expansionist power.117

Also, the rise in

popularity of the FRG's anti-nuclear Green Party in West
Germany, increased the US government’s concerns about West
European security.

However, because the FRG had more

autonomy in foreign policy than the GDR did, the United
States had fewer methods of controlling the West German
leaders than the Soviet Union had of influencing the East
German regime.
Despite the worsening of relations between the United
States and the Soviet Union, the West-East German
relationship continued.

Although the USSR sought to get the

SED government to reduce its autonomy in inter-German
relations, the East German regime was reluctant to do so.
Too much would be lost by minimizing relations with West
Germany, economically as well as politically.

So, a

confident Honecker saw it beneficial for his state and
regime to continue relations with the West.

However as the

next chapter reveals, not only did he underestimate the
affects of West German penetration in East German society,
but his attempts to form foreign policy autonomous from the
Soviet Union and its new leader would undermine the
stability of his regime.

117Hanhardt, 380.

CHAPTER VI
GORBACHEV AND THE EAST GERMAN REVOLUTION:

1985-90

On 11 March 1985, the young, dynamic Mikhail S.
Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union (CPSU).

In less than five years this man

would alter the balance of power dramatically in Europe by
renouncing Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe.

Gorbachev's

approach to reforming the Soviet economic, political and
social systems led the East German population to demand
similar reforms by the SED government.

The East German

regime, whose stability was guaranteed by Soviet force
alone, failed to listen to its citizens' demands and faced
mounting discontent.

The turning point came when Gorbachev

refrained from using Soviet force to prop up the SED regime
in the face of mass protests in October 1989, an external
political decision which catalyzed the unexpected East
German revolution and allowed for the reunification of
Germany.

Once again, the international environment affected

the internal politics of the GDR in a fashion that no one
predicted— the loss of even the facade of SED legitimation;
the demise of communist hegemony; and the resolution of the
postwar German reunification question.
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Before analyzing the events preceding the East German
revolution, it is first necessary to define the term
•revolution'.

Revolutions are complex events and a variety

of definitions exist.

One element found in most revolution

theories is the use of violence.118

However, the

revolution which occurred in East Germany did not entail
violence.

Despite the lack of violence, one can argue that

a revolution did take place.

According to theorist Ekkart

Zimmermann, although the use of violence is not the
characteristic of revolutions, violence is often an
unavoidable component in bringing about a revolution.119
The most important aspect of a revolution is that
transformations occur in the prevailing social and political
structures.
idea.

Samuel Huntington's definition expands on this

Huntington states:
A revolution is a rapid, fundamental . . . change in
the dominant values [concepts of legitimacy] and myths
of a society, in its political institutions, social
structure [economic relationships], leadership, and
government activity and policies [in short, the
demolition of the existing social, economic, and
political order and the effort to substitute an
entirely new one].120

118See Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing
Societies (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1968), 264?
Mark Hagopian, The Phenomenon of Revolution (New York:
Dodd, Mead and Co., 1974), 1; Nicholas Timasheff, War and
Revolution (New York:
Sheed and Ward, 1965), 12.
119Ekkart Zimmermann, Political Violence. Crises, and
Revolutions:
Theories and Research (Boston:
G. K. Hall &
Co., 1983), 296.
120Huntington, 264.
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Using hindsight, there can be no disagreement that the
events of 1989-1990 in East Germany brought transformations
in the country’s social, economic and political structures.
Therefore, despite the lack of violence, it seems clear that
a revolution did take place in East Germany.
Many existing theories seek to explain the causes of
revolution through social or psychological observations or
by focusing on the structure of state institutions and their
economies.121

Still, these interpretations do not provide

a complete account of the causes of revolution in East
Germany.
One major flaw found in many revolution theories is
that they tend to minimize or overlook the importance of
external factors contributing to revolution.

This is not to

say that internal factors are not important for
understanding revolution, only that in the particular case
of East Germany— a state dominated by the Soviet Union and
strongly influenced by the FRG— external forces contributed
profoundly to the GDR's revolution.

Because the economic

and political links which connected the GDR to the Soviet

121See Jack A. Goldstone, ed., Revolutions:
Theoretical. Comparative, and Historical Studies (New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1986), 1-2; James Davies,
"Toward a Theory of Revolution," American Sociological
Review 27 (February 1962), 6; Theda Skocpol, States and
Social Revolutions:
A Comparative Analysis of France.
Russia, and China (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press,
1979), 4, 33.
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Union were so strong, the USSR possessed the means to affect
domestic developments in East Germany.

At the same time,

the FRG contributed to East German revolution by providing
the East Germans with alternatives to their restricted
lifestyles.
As discussed in Chapter IV, the G D R 1s economy faltered.
Nevertheless, according to American foreign policy expert
Jeane Kirkpatrick, the internal economic situation should
not be seen as the reason for the GDR revolt; rather, it was
the Soviet Union's own appalling economic situation that
eventually triggered revolution in East Germany.122
In the Soviet Union, the new leader, Gorbachev, faced
pressing economic problems.

Due to a multitude of factors,

the USSR's economy was in shambles.123

First, the inherent

distortions and inefficiencies of the Soviet centrally
planned system (the same one it forced onto the GDR) failed
and gradually caused the deterioration of the economy.
Second, the economic concessions the USSR granted to its
satellite states (including East Germany) also hurt the
Soviet economy:

"Moscow used what has amounted to Soviet

subsidies in order to achieve and maintain East European

122Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Enough to Break an Old
Bolshevik's Heart," Washington Post. 8 November 1989, 23(A).
123T o analyze the Soviet economic failures would be
another paper in itself, and therefore the author will
provide only a summary.
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economic structures."124

Third, the role the USSR played

as the military leader of the Warsaw Pact added to the
Soviet Union's financial burdens, as well as its role in the
Afghanistan War and other costly Third World conflicts.
Finally, the intensification of the military rivalry with
the United States under President Reagan contributed to the
Soviet Union's economic crisis.

Reagan challenged the

Soviets to an all-out arms race through the deployment of
the INF missiles and the introduction of the Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI).

The USSR had to divert resources

towards its defense industry to meet the US challenge; the
Soviet Union spent money it needed to invest in modernizing
the civilian sector on defense instead to maintain its
superpower status.

In essence, a combination of internal

and external economic conditions forced the Soviet
leadership to consider a new path for the USSR— one that
would place Soviet national interests first, above the
interests of international communism.

This new path

ultimately led Gorbachev to abandon the communist leaders in
the Soviet Union's satellite bloc.
Gorbachev tried to transform the Soviet Union,
economically, socially and politically, via his reform
policies of qlasnost and perestroika.

These reforms

conflicted with the communist ideology of the past.
Glasnost called for more openness and democratization in the
124Dawisha, 90.

79
tightly centralized and controlled political system.
Economic reforms of perestroika included decentralization of
industry, decreasing price subsidies, and improving the
quality of goods produced in the Soviet Union.

These

reforms were intended to introduce aspects of a market
economy into the centrally planned economic system.
Gorbachev called for

reforms to prevent the collapse of the

Soviet economy through the introduction of some elements
found in free-market economic systems.
At the onset, Gorbachev's reforms appeared to be
intended solely for the USSR and not Eastern Europe, as he
promised not to force Soviet reform onto the communist bloc
nations; however, even if Gorbachev intended for qlasnost
and perestroika to apply only to the Soviet Union, the East
Germans were deeply influenced by the reforms.

They

understood that Gorbachev's proclamations for fundamental
reform in the Soviet Union had enormous implications for
their future development too.

As political scientist Karen

Dawisha contends, "by opening the debate in the Soviet Union
about radical reform, the Soviets were implicitly giving,
whether they wished or not, the green light for similar
debates and experiments throughout Eastern Europe [including
the GDR]."125

The East Germans, as other communist

satellite populations, began to believe that things could

125Ibid., 163.
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change.

Admired by the East German people for reforming,

Gorbachev soon became their inspiration and role model.
Gradually, by the late 1980s, Gorbachev began to
encourage Eastern European states to follow the reforms of
the Soviet Union by stating:

"Moscow will tolerate almost

any political or economic system among its allies, as long
as they remain in the Warsaw Pact and do nothing detrimental
to Soviet security interests.1,126

According to political

analyst Elizabeth Pound, the Soviet leader hoped that topdown reforms would prevent bottom-up revolution.127
Reforms flowing downwards, from the communist leaders rather
than upwards from the masses, could act as a pressure valve.
The leaders would decide on the type of reform and then
would control the amount of change.
Honecker!s fear of change caused him to cool relations
with the USSR as the radical Gorbachev suggested strongly
that the GDR consider economic, political and social
reforms.

The SED leader clung to his orthodox views,

believing that Gorbachev's radical reforms would fail.

In

addition, Honecker and other aging SED leaders perceived
East Germany as a superior socialist state compared to the
Soviet Union, claiming:

"We can say with complete

justification that we have built a society .that can stand
126George Church, "Freedom," Time, 20 November 1989, 29.
127Elizabeth Pound, "A Wall Destroyed:
The Dynamics of
German Unification in the GDR, International Security 15
(Fall 1990), 35.
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any comparison.1,128

When speaking at the SED Congress in

April 1986, Honecker*s tone was described as "selfsatisfaction that approaches eulogy" and even with Gorbachev
present, he failed to follow the usual routine of
acknowledging the Soviet Union as the vanguard leader.129
Honecker appeared confident in refusing to accept
Gorbachev's reform policies.

In November 1987, Chief

ideologist Kurt Hager officially rejected qlasnost as a
model for the GDR.130

The SED government even tried to

censor West German and Soviet telecommunications and printed
material which alluded to perestroika or qlasnost.

The East

German regime remained skeptical of any revisions towards a
democratic political or a free-market economic system
because it saw them as being extremely dangerous to its
stability.

Honecker realized the threat of these reforms.

They would remove East Germany's whole defense for needing a
separate, socialist identity and would certainly lead to the
GDR's assimilation into the more appealing West German
state.131

As East European analyst Otto Ulc notes:

"Gorbachev's reforms mean destabilizing, politically risky
1280tto Ulc, "The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: Will
the Reforms in the USSR Make a Difference?" In The
Uncertain Future:
Gorbachev's Eastern Bloc, eds. Nicholas
N. Kittrie and Ivan Volgyes (New York:
Paragon House,
1988), 130.
129Ibid.
130Pound, 39.
131Ibid., 41.
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cures— cures that are even more risky for governments with a
precarious legitimacy.”132
Gorbachev's renunciation of the use of force applied
not only to his decision not to coerce Eastern European
regimes to reform, but also to his decision not to intervene
in the anti-regime uprisings which swept Eastern Europe in
the fall of 1989.

Gorbachev opted not to use coercion

because he had renounced the Brezhnev Doctrine and the use
of force in the Soviet's satellite states.

As Soviet

foreign ministry spokesman Gennady Gerasimov stated:

"The

time is past when the Soviet Union would intervene
militarily in Eastern Europe in the name of socialism."133
The Soviet Union did not want to reduce its chances of
improving relations with the West which any act of coercion
might do:
Clearly the Soviets want nothing to happen in Eastern
Europe that would jeopardize the arms reductions with
the West or interfere with their attempt to cut through
the isolation from Western economies.
That means no
Soviet tanks in the streets to repress Eastern European
demonstrations and insurrections.134
The USSR's decision not to use force to prop up its
client states in Eastern Europe had momentous consequences

132Ulc, 125.
133Bennett Korvig, "To End an Empire: Western Dilemmas
in Eastern Europe," In the Uncertain Future:
Gorbachev's
Eastern Bloc, eds. Nicholas N. Kittrie and Ivan Volgyes (New
York:
Paragon House, 1988), 216.
1340pinion Editorial, "East Germany's Fall and Rise,"
Washington Post. 19 November 1989, 6(D).

for the fate of the East German regime.

Jeane Kirkpatrick

and other foreign policy experts agree that in the past the
SED survived only by absolute force.135

After the Soviet

troops squashed the 1953 rebellion, the Soviets remained
with an estimated 3 50,000 troops.

Western analysts,

politicians and foreign policy makers held the conventional
wisdom that the East Germans felt passive acceptance towards
their communist government; however, the truth was that in
the past, the East Germans' fear of Soviet intervention had
overpowered their desire for change.
states:

In effect, as Dawisha

"The military . . . has thus proved to be the most

reliable instrument of ultimate Soviet control."136

By

ignoring Gorbachev and his calls to reform, Honecker's
regime risked losing its only base of authority.

Without

Soviet military support, the SED government would be left
without any other foundation of power.
When Gorbachev reversed the Brezhnev Doctrine and
condemned the use of force, elites in the conservative,
anti-reform GDR now were vulnerable to a populace desperate
for change.

Without the Soviet troops, the SED leaders

"were left to confront their own countrymen without certain
support from the Soviet troops they had welcomed."137

135Kirkpatrick.
136Dawisha, 84.
137Kirkpatr ick.
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On 7 October 1989, during a speech in East Germany
celebrating the 40th anniversary of the GDR, comments made
by Gorbachev indicated that he wanted the SED regime to
follow his reform policy, warning:

"The decisions [for

reform] lay with the East German leaders . . . but 'life
punishes him who comes too late.1"138

At the same time, he

stated that East Germany must decide its own future.

This

declaration signalled to many East German observers that
Soviet troops would not be used to maintain a communist
139
regime.,
:>y

By tolerating revolutionary events in other Eastern
bloc nations, such as Poland electing a non-communist
government, Hungary destroying its barbed wire border with
Austria, and Czechoslovakia releasing East German exiles to
the FRG, the USSR impressed on the East Germans that it
would not use force against those who tried to reform.
Because of his declaration that the use of force would not
be tolerated and his record of toleration, East Germans
assumed Gorbachev would restrain his troops.

(The Soviet

chief of staff in Moscow commanded the Warsaw Pact troops
stationed in the GDR.)

Without worries of Soviet

intervention, East Germans were relatively free to revolt.

138Pound, 42.
139Gorbachev had previously shown his tolerance and
acceptance for non-socialist reforms in other Eastern bloc
states, such as Poland and Hungary, by not using force to
overturn them.
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And just as the East Germans expected, when the uprisings
began, the troops did not act with repressive measures.140
Without the Soviet troops, Honecker was left without
any source of authority, and the essential illegitimacy of
his regime was exposed.. It became clear that the SED regime
had failed to build legitimacy.

The illegitimacy of the

regime had several sources.
First, Honecker and other members of the Politburo
remained isolated from, rather than responsive to, the
citizens in whose name they supposedly ruled.
between the elite and the populace existed.

Few ties
Elections in

the GDR were meaningless because they offered no substantial
political alternatives to the SED.

The function of

elections was to provide a propaganda campaign for the
policies of the SED and state.
ruler accountability.

There also was a lack of

The East German leaders were not

accountable to the 'voters'; citizens' demands went, for the
most part, unnoticed.

So, the leaders of the GDR were not

representatives of the people, as communist ideology
espoused.
Second, communist ideology failed to bring about any
legitimacy to the SED government.

One important goal of

140Although the Soviet troops did not overcome the
protestors, Honecker did call the East German police
(Stasis) to quiet the rioters during the October 7 protest.
Afterwards, when the crowds had grown too large for the
police forces to suppress, he told the troops to prepare for
attack? however, his orders went ignored.
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communist ideology, the creation of a classless society,
failed to be accomplished in the GDR.

In East Germany class

did exist, and the elite remained far better off than the
rest of society.

In the GDR, the communist leaders drove

flashy Western cars, shopped in specialty stores and
maintained vacation homes, while most East German citizens
had few choices and inferior products.

Milovan Djilas

introduced the argument of the "new class," in which
communism instead of destroying the class system, merely
substituted a new elite for the old bourgeoisie.141

This

theory proved to be true regarding the GDR.
Also, the democratic centralist principle used for
decision making and administration within the East German
communist party remained a second failure of communist
ideology.

It was only a facade in which centralism took

pure precedence over democratic principles.

A small elite

group made decisions which the rest of the party had to
approve without any dissent.

Therefore, decisions made by

the elite lacked any real popular support.
Finally, the failure of the SED regime to meet its
economic goals and achievements prevented the government
from gaining legitimacy.

Although the SED leaders continued

to proclaim the GDR to be an economic miracle, contacts with
West Germany, as well as cutbacks in Soviet subsidies and

141See Milovan Djilas, The New Class;
An Analysis of
the Communist System (New York:
Frederick A. Prager, 1957).
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aid, proved the SED regime's claim of its state's superior
status false.
Honecker's desire to continue relations with the FRG
forced him to deal with the delicate and difficult task of
balancing capitalism and socialism.
his control.

This task proved beyond

The infiltration of West German technology and

ideas showed the East Germans that their regime had deceived
them about the GDR being a superior economic state.
Germans wanted the Western alternative.

East

Also, the East

Germans learned that not only was the USSR, or the "vanguard
leader" of socialism, attempting reforms but that reforms
were taking place in other East European countries,
particularly Hungary and Poland.

Despite the demands by the

East Germans and requests from Mikhail Gorbachev for the GDR
leadership to initiate reforms, Honecker refused.

Thus, the

Soviet Union withdrew its support from the Honecker regime.
Because the SED regime failed to follow Gorbachev's
popular reform model and lost the backing of the Soviet
Union and its troops, it no longer retained any form of
legitimacy.

Without any popular or Soviet troop support,

the SED had no prospects for survival.

The GDR held

elections in March of 1990 similar to those found in
democratic nations; the SED did not win.

As fears over

economic conditions rose, so too did aspirations for a
unified Germany.

Although Great Britain, France and the

Soviet Union had several reservations about German
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reunification, the United States supported it.

In reality,

these states, including the Soviet Union, possessed little
if any real power to prevent reunification from occurring
(although East and West Germany did include them in their
talks concerning reunification).

Throughout the decades,

the world heard reunification rhetoric.

When the time for

it finally came, nearly everyone seems to have been taken by
surprise, with respect to the speed of events, at the least.
On 3 October 1990, East and West Germany merged and finally
ended the forty year old German question.

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION

Until the fall of 1989, most western states did not
anticipate the decline of the Soviet Union's hegemony over
East Germany.

The leaders of these western states also

failed to foresee the possibility of the East German
communists relinquishing control of East Germany.

No one

single factor is responsible for ending the SED's domination
in East Germany.

However, as Peter Gourevitch's hypothesis

suggests, by analyzing domestic and international events
together as a whole and not separately, one can understand
the reasons behind the overthrow of the SED regime.

In

fact, analyzing the downfall of the SED by another method
would only provide an incomplete evaluation of the event.
This thesis concludes that three main factors, one
internal and two external, contributed to the East German
revolution.

The internal factor consisted of the SED

regime's inability to fulfill the promises that it made to
the East German population.

When comparing East and West

Germany, the SED proclaimed West Germany to be a socially
and economically inferior state.

However, after several

decades in power, the SED regime failed to make East Germany
an economically superior state.

Additionally, the regime

failed ideologically to convince the East Germans of their
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state's superiority.

This fact was emphasized by a second

factor leading to the regime's overthrow.
The impact of West German financial, cultural and
technical penetration into East German society continued to
prove to the East Germans that West Germany was indeed
beyond their state's comparison.

This fact was made more

apparent as the number of people with access to television
increased.

Television brought news and information from the

uncensored West German state into the homes of most East
Germans.

Now the East Germans had real proof that their

leaders' claims were just propaganda, and life in West
Germany continued to be more appealing to those individuals
in the GDR.
Finally, the rapidly deteriorating economic situation
in the Soviet Union led to the SED regime's downfall.
Gorbachev introduced reforms in the Soviet Union and
gradually began pressuring the SED leadership to introduce
similar reforms.

By doing so, Gorbachev openly challenged

the authority of the anti-reformist East German leaders.
The East German communists, however, ignored Gorbachev and
his demands for change.

Gorbachev decided that Soviet

hegemony over East Germany, as well as other East European
states, was no longer in the USSR's best interest.

With

this thought in mind, he guaranteed that Soviet troops would
no longer be used to maintain the East German regime. When
it became apparent to the East German population that the
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Soviet Union would no longer use force to back the SED
government, the people revolted.

Without force, the SED

regime had no economic, ideologic or popular basis of
legitimacy and no basis for governing.

With no indigenous

support, no Soviet military support and a population eager
for change, the Government of the GDR fell, as the East
Germans revolted against their SED regime and laid the
foundation for a reunified German state.
This combination of international and domestic factors
led to the revolution which ended over forty years of SED
domination.

To examine only one factor would provide an

incomplete analysis of the reasons for the collapse of the
SED regime.

This thesis shows how three important factors

contributed to the radical transformations which occurred in
what was once a state known as East Germany.
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